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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly crucial in safety-
critical systems, for example in their perception layer to analyze
images. Unfortunately, there is a lack of methods to ensure the
functional safety of DNN-based components. The machine learn-
ing literature suggests one should trust DNNs demonstrating high
accuracy on test sets. In case of low accuracy, DNNs should be
retrained using additional inputs similar to the error-inducing ones.
We observe two major challenges with existing practices for safety-
critical systems: (1) scenarios that are underrepresented in the test
set may represent serious risks, which may lead to safety violations,
and may not be noticed; (2) debugging DNNs is poorly supported
when error causes are difficult to visually detect.
To address these problems, we propose HUDD, an approach
that automatically supports the identification of root causes for
DNN errors. We automatically group error-inducing images whose
results are due to common subsets of DNN neurons. HUDD iden-
tifies root causes by applying a clustering algorithm to matrices
(i.e., heatmaps) capturing the relevance of every DNN neuron on
the DNN outcome. Also, HUDD retrains DNNs with images that
are automatically selected based on their relatedness to the iden-
tified image clusters. We have evaluated HUDD with DNNs from
the automotive domain. The approach was able to automatically
identify all the distinct root causes of DNN errors, thus supporting
safety analysis. Also, our retraining approach has shown to be more
effective at improving DNN accuracy than existing approaches.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Software testing and de-
bugging; • Computing methodologies→ Artificial intelligence.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are common building blocks in
many modern software systems. This is particularly true for cyber-
physical systems (e.g., their perception layer) and the automotive
sector, where DNN-based products have shown the capability to
automate difficult tasks. For example, DNNs are used in Advanced
Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) to automate driving tasks such
as emergency braking or lane changing [30, 39]. The rise of DNN-
based systems concerns all component manufacturers that produce
intelligent car components [18, 43]. This is the case of IPA [18],
our industry partner, who develops in-vehicle monitoring systems
such as drowsiness detection and gaze detection systems [29].
DNNs consist of layers of hundreds of neurons transforming
high-dimensional vectors through linear and non-linear activation
functions, whose parameters are learned during training. Such
structure prevents engineers from understanding the rationale of
predictions through manual inspection of DNNs and, consequently,
inhibits software quality assurance practices that rely on the analy-
sis and understanding of the system logic. Such practices include
failure root cause analysis and program debugging, which are the
target of this paper.
A root cause is a source of a defect such that if it is removed, the
defect is decreased or removed [15]. With DNN-based systems, root
cause analysis consists in characterizing system inputs that lead to
erroneous DNN results. For example, in image classification tasks, a
root cause of DNN errors could be severe gender imbalance leading
the DNN to label most female doctors as nurses; it might be detected
after noticing that error-inducing inputs have long hair [36]. The
DNN can be efficiently retrained after including in the training set
additional images featuring these error-inducing characteristics.
When DNN-based systems are used in a safety-critical context,
root cause analysis is required to support safety analysis. Indeed,
safety standards such as ISO26262 [16] and ISO/PAS 21448 [17]
enforce the identification of the situations in which the system
might be unsafe (i.e., provide erroneous outputs) and the design of
countermeasures to put in place (e.g., integrating different types
of sensors). In the case of DNN-based systems, because of their
complex structure, the identification of unsafe situations can be
performed only through root cause analysis.
When inputs are images, which is our focus here, existing so-
lutions for root cause analysis generate heatmaps that use colors
to capture the importance of pixels in their contribution to a DNN
result [26, 36]. By inspecting the heatmaps generated for a set
of erroneous results, a human operator can determine that these
heatmaps highlight the same objects, which may suggest the root
cause of the problem (e.g., long hair [36]). Based on the identified
root cause, engineers can then retrain the DNN using additional
images with similar characteristics. Unfortunately, this process is
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expensive and error-prone because it relies on the visual inspection
of many generated heatmaps. MODE goes beyond visual inspection
and supports the automated debugging of DNNs [23]. However,
MODE cannot support safety analysis because it does not help
identify plausible and distinct root causes of DNN errors.
To overcome the limitations above, we propose Heatmap-based
Unsupervised Debugging of DNNs (HUDD). HUDD relies on hi-
erarchical agglomerative clustering [20] combined with a specific
heatmap-based distance function to identify clusters of error-inducing
images with similar heatmaps for internal layers. Since heatmaps
capture the importance of neurons regarding their contribution
to the DNN result, error-inducing images with similar heatmaps
should share characteristics that drive the generation of erroneous
DNN results. Each cluster should thus characterize a distinct root
cause for the observed DNN errors, even in cases where such causes
are infrequent. We focus on internal DNN layers because they act
as an abstraction over the inputs (e.g., ignore image background).
HUDD relies on the computed clusters to identify new images to
be used to retrain the DNN. More precisely, given a potentially large
set of collected or generated unlabeled images, HUDD selects the
subset of images that more likely belong to the identified clusters
according to a heatmap-based distance. These images are then
labeled by engineers and used to retrain the network.
We performed an empirical evaluation on four DNNs. Our em-
pirical results show that HUDD can automatically and accurately
identify the different root causes of DNN errors. Also, our results
show that the HUDD retraining process, even when applied to ex-
tremely accurate DNN models, improves DNN accuracy up to 12.79
percentage points and is more effective than baseline approaches.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the con-
text and motivation for this work. Section 3 presents background
information. Section 4 presents the proposed approach in details.
Section 5 reports on the results of our empirical evaluation. Sec-
tion 6 discusses related work. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 MOTIVATION AND CONTEXT
In this section, we introduce the context of our research, i.e., safety
analysis and debugging of DNN-based automotive systems. We
explain why automated root cause analysis is necessary to enable
functional safety analysis for DNN-based automotive systems. Also,
we show how DNN accuracy improvement can be facilitated by the
automated identification of error-inducing inputs (i.e., inputs that
make the DNN generate erroneous results).
2.1 DNN-based automotive systems
Our work is motivated by the challenges encountered in industry
sectors developing safety-critical systems, such as in IPA [18], a
supplier of sensing solutions active in the automotive market and
the provider of our case studies. For example, IPA develops a gaze
detection system (GDS) which uses DNNs to determine the gaze
direction of the driver, from images captured by a camera on the
instrument panel of the car.
IPA is evaluating the feasibility of different GDS system archi-
tectures. Figure 1 shows an architecture consisting of three DNNs
(i.e., CropDNN, GazeDNN_L, GazeDNN_R). CropDNN identifies
face landmarks that enable the cropping of images containing the
GazeDNN_R
CropDNN
GazeDNN_L
LeftEye RightEye
CameraImage
EyeGaze
Direc4on
EyeGaze
Direction
Figure 1: DNN-based
system for gaze de-
tection. Figure 2: Gaze directions.
eyes only. GazeDNN_L and GazeDNN_R classify the gaze direction
into eight classes (i.e., TopLeft, TopCenter, TopRight, MiddleLeft,
MiddleRight, BottomLeft, BottomCenter, and BottomRight).
To reduce training costs, IPA relies on training sets containing
images that are collected from driving scenes and images generated
by simulation software. Simulators are used to reduce the costs
related to data collection and data labeling. Indeed, models of the
dynamics of real-world elements (e.g., eyeballs) are used to generate
hundreds of images in a few hours [41]. Further, and this is impor-
tant in terms of cost saving, simulation enables the processing of
model parameters used to generate the images in order to automat-
ically assign labels to them. While simulator images alleviate the
costs of training, testing ultimately requires real-world images as
well.
In our experiments with IPA, we rely on the UnityEyes simulator
to generate eye images [41]. UnityEyes combines a generative 3D
model of the human eye region with a real-time rendering frame-
work. We determine the gaze direction label from the gaze angle
parameter provided by UnityEyes, based on predefined gaze ranges
depicted in Figure 2. For example, we assign the label TopCenter
when the gaze angle is between 67.5 and 112.5 degrees.
2.2 Debugging of DNN-based Systems
IPA engineers train the DNNs that compose their systems by follow-
ing the standard machine learning process depicted in Figure 3-a.
They first train the DNN using a training set with labeled images
(Step A) and then execute the DNN against a labeled test set (Step
B). This process enables engineers to evaluate the DNN accuracy
(i.e., the portion of images leading to correct results).
When the accuracy of the system is not adequate, engineers im-
prove the DNN by augmenting the training set with error-inducing
images. This process is depicted in Figure 3-b. First, engineers gen-
erate a set of new images to be used to retrain the DNN (Step C).
We call this set of images improvement set. The improvement set
generally consists of images collected from the field since these
tend to be error-inducing when DNNs have been trained using
simulator images. Real-world images must be manually labelled
(Step D). The DNN model is tested with the improvement set and
images that lead to DNN errors are identified (Step E). This set of
error-inducing (unsafe) images is considered to retrain the DNN
(Step G), using as initial configuration for DNN weights the ones
in the previously trained model.
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Figure 3: State-of-the-art training and debugging DNNs.
To improve the DNN, it is necessary to process a sufficiently large
number of unsafe images. For this reason, the number of unsafe
images can be augmented by applying bagging (i.e., by replicating
samples in the unsafe set) till a target is achieved (Step F). Finally,
the improved DNN can be assessed on the test set (Step H).
Even with bagging, generating a sufficiently diverse set of error-
inducing inputs that include all possible causes of DNN errors might
be very difficult. When the labeling of such images is manual, the
costs of labeling becomes prohibitive and DNN improvement is
infeasible. For this reason, automatically characterizing images
that are likely to lead to DNN errorswould allow the image gen-
eration or selection to target specific types of images and increase
the efficiency of the DNN retraining process.
2.3 Functional safety analysis
IPA products must comply with the functional safety standards
ISO 26262 and ISO/PAS 21448. Functional safety is ensured by
identifying, for each component of the product (e.g., the DNNs
of the GDS), the unsafe conditions that could lead to hazards, by
identifying countermeasures (e.g., redundant components), and by
demonstrating that these unsafe conditions are unlikely.
ISO/PAS 21448, targeting autonomous systems, recommends
to determine unsafe conditions by following the traditional DNN
testing process depicted in Figure 3-a and by manually inspecting
the error-inducing tests to look for root causes of DNN errors. In
a DNN context, unsafe conditions thus correspond to root causes of
DNN errors.
According to ISO/PAS 21448, engineers can set a quantitative
target for accuracy evaluation to demonstrate that unsafe situations
are unlikely. However, ISO/PAS 21448 also clarifies that quantita-
tive targets should overlook potentially hazardous scenarios, thus
implying that engineers are liable for errors made when defining
the test set.
In addition, the manual identification of unsafe conditions is
error-prone. For example, engineers may overlook unsafe condi-
tions that are underrepresented in the test set. Also, underrep-
resented unsafe conditions may lead to a false estimation of the
accuracy of the system. For example, UnityEyes generates eye im-
ages where the horizontal angle of the head is determined based
on a uniform distribution, between 160 (head turned right) and
220 degrees (head turned left). This configuration leads to very few
images with an angle of 160 degrees, and though it is an unsafe
condition (i.e., it leads to the estimation of a wrong gaze direction
because the eye is barely visible), such experiments with UnityEyes
suggests the DNN is very accurate. It is, however, important for
engineers to know that the DNN is unsafe when the driver turns
his head while driving.
In summary, accuracy estimation results depend on the test set,
which may not include all unsafe conditions in a representative
or balanced manner. Automated root cause analysis helps making
sure, through clustering, that even rare, unsafe conditions are made
visible to the analyst, especially when analysis time is limited. In
other words, clustering based on heatmaps makes safety analysis
robust to imperfect test sets.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 DNN Explanation and Heatmaps
Approaches that aim to explain DNN results have been developed in
recent years [9]. Most of these concern the generation of heatmaps
that capture the importance of pixels in image predictions. They in-
clude black-box [5, 31] and white-box approaches [26, 36, 38, 42, 46].
Black-box approaches generate heatmaps for the input layer and
do not provide insights regarding internal DNN layers. In this
paper, we therefore resort to white box approaches which rely
on the backpropagation of the relevance score computed by the
DNN [26, 36, 38, 42, 46]; Castanon et al. provide an overview of
the state of the art [4]. In this paper, we rely on Layer-Wise Rele-
vance Propagation (LRP) [26] because of the limitations of other
approaches. First, solutions [46] backpropagating only the differ-
ence in activations between the different classes may compromise
clustering. Deconvolutional networks [42] and guided backpropa-
gation [38] lead to sparse heatmaps that do not fully explain the
DNN result [34]. Grad-CAM [36] does not work with convolutional
DNN layers. LRP, instead, generates precise, non-sparse heatmaps
for all the DNN layers because it takes into account all the different
factors affecting the relevance of a neuron, which include the DNN
structure and the neuron activations.
LRP redistributes the relevance scores of neurons in a higher
layer to those of the lower layer. Assuming j and k to be two con-
secutive layers of the DNN, LRP propagates the relevance scores
computed for a given layerk into a neuron of the lower layer j . It has
been theoretically justified as a form of Taylor decomposition [27].
Figure 4 illustrates the execution of LRP on a fully connected
network used to classify inputs. LRP analyzes the data processed
by a DNN and can be applied to any DNN architecture. In the
forward pass, the DNN receives an input and generates an output
(e.g., classifies the gaze direction as TopLeft) while keeping trace
of the activations of each neuron. The heatmap is generated in a
backward pass.
In Figure 4, blue lines show that the DNN score of the selected
class is backpropagated to lower layers. Plain lines show the con-
nections concerned by the propagation formula used to compute
the relevance (Rji ) of neuron i at layer j from all the connected
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neurons in layer k . Rji =
∑
l ( zji_kl∑i zji_kl ∗Rkl ), where zji_kl captures
the extent to which neuron ji has contributed to make neuron kl
relevant, and Rkl captures the relevance of neuron l at layer k . In
our experiments, we have applied LRP to Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs) using Linear, MaxPooling and Convolutional
layers [10]. We rely on the LRP and zjk implementation provided
by LRP authors [25].
The heatmap in Figure 4 shows that the result computed by the
DNN was mostly influenced by the pupil and part of the eyelid,
which are the non-white parts in the heatmap.
An additional key benefit of LRP is that it enables the computa-
tion of internal heatmaps, i.e., heatmaps for the internal layers of
the DNN, based on the relevance score computed for every neuron
in every layer. An internal heatmap for a layer k consists of a matrix
with the relevance scores computed for all the neurons of layer k .
3.2 Unsupervised Learning
Unsupervised learning concerns the automated identification of
patterns in data sets without pre-existing labels. In this paper, we
rely on hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) [20] to identify
groups of error-inducing images with similar characteristics.
HAC is a bottom up approach in which each observation starts
in its own cluster and pairs of clusters are iteratively merged into a
sequence of nested partitions. The input of HAC is a matrix captur-
ing the distance between every observation pair. The grouping that
occurs at each step aims to minimize an objective function. In HAC,
widely adopted objective functions, which we use in our work, are
the error sum of squares within clusters (i.e.,WardâĂŹs linkage
method [40]), to help minimize within-cluster variance, and the
average of distances between all pairs of elements belonging to dis-
tinct clusters (i.e.,average linkage [37]), to help maximize diversity
among clusters.
HAC leads to a hierarchy of clusters which can be represented
as a dendrogram. To automatically identify the optimal number of
clusters, we rely on the computation of the Silhouette Coefficient,
which is standard practice since it maximizes cohesion (i.e., how
closely related objects are in a cluster) and separation (i.e., how
well-separated a cluster is from other clusters).
TopRight
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Layer
DNN with LRP
Layer k
DNN
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Right
TopCenter
TopLeft
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wj1k1
wj1k2
wj1k3
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Output of LRPO
Legend:
Neuron connections
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Figure 4: Layer-Wise Relevance Propagation.
We chose HAC over K-means [24] since it does not require the
computation of cluster centroids [28], which is particularly expen-
sive when differences between observations are computed from
large heatmap matrices. We leave to future work the evaluation of
other clustering solutions.
4 THE HUDD APPROACH
Figure 5 provides an overview of our approach, HUDD, which
consists of six steps. In Step 1, HUDD performs heatmap-based
clustering. This is a core contribution of this paper and consists of
three activities: (1) generate heatmaps for the error-inducing test
set images, (2) compute distances between every pair of images
using a distance function based on the heatmap of each image, and
(3) execute hierarchical agglomerative clustering to group images
based on the computed distances. Step 1 leads to the identification
of root cause clusters, i.e., clusters of images with a common root
cause for the observed DNN errors.
In Step 2, engineers inspect the root cause clusters (typically a
small number of representative images) to identify unsafe condi-
tions, as required by functional safety analysis.
In Step 3, engineers rely on real-world data or simulation soft-
ware to generate a new set of images to retrain the DNN.
In Step 4, HUDD automatically identifies the subset of images
belonging to the improvement set that are likely to lead to DNN
errors, referred to as unsafe set. It is obtained by assigning the
images of the improvement set to the root cause clusters according
to their heatmap-based distance.
In Step 5, engineers manually label the images belonging to the
unsafe set, if needed (e.g., in the case of real images). Different from
traditional practice (see Figure 3-b), HUDD requires that engineers
label only a small subset of the improvement set.
In Step 6, to improve the accuracy of the DNN for every root
cause observed, independently from their frequency of appearance
in the training set, HUDD balances the labeled unsafe set using a
bagging approach.
In Step 7, the DNN model is retrained by relying on a training
set that consists of the union of the original training set and the
balanced labeled unsafe set.
The following sections describe in detail all the steps of the ap-
proach, except Steps 3 and 5, which were introduced in Section 2.2.
Step1.
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Root cause clusters
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Label images
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Unsafe Images
Error-inducing
test set images
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C2 C3
Simulator execution
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Collection of field data
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Step 7. DNN
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Figure 5: Overview of HUDD.
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4.1 Heatmap-based clustering
HUDD is based on the intuition that, since heatmaps capture the
relevance of each neuron on DNN results, error-inducing inputs
sharing the same root cause should show similar heatmaps. For
this reason, to identify the root causes of DNN errors, we rely on
clustering based on heatmaps. Figure 6 provides an overview of our
clustering approach.
For each error-inducing image in the test set, HUDD relies on
LRP to generate heatmaps of internal DNN layers. Each heatmap
captures the relevance score of each neuron in that layer.
The generated heatmaps are used to generate, for each DNN
layer, a distance matrix that captures the distance between every
pair of error-inducing image in the test set. The distance between a
pair of images ⟨a,b⟩, at layer L, is computed as follows:
heatmapDistanceL (a, b) = EuclideanDistance(H La , H Lb ) (1)
where HLx is the heatmap computed for image x at layer L.
EuclideanDistance is a function that computes the euclidean dis-
tance between two N ×M matrices according to the formula
EuclideanDistance(A, B) =
√√ N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
(Ai, j − Bi, j )2 (2)
where Ai, j and Bi, j are the values in the cell at row i and column j
of the matrix.
For each layer, we identify clusters of images by relying on the
HAC algorithm with Ward linkage and by selecting the optimal
number of clusters for that layer using the Silhouette Coefficient.
Since DNN layers have the objective of transforming data into
more abstract representations [3], clustering results may vary from
layer to layer. In our context, clustering results are informative if
they group together images that are misclassified for a same reason.
HUDD identifies the layer with the most cohesive clusters based
on the weighted average intra-cluster distance (WeightedAvgICD),
which we define according to the following formula
WeightedAvgICD(Ll ) =
∑|Ll |
j=1
(
ICD(Ll , Cj ) ∗ |Cj ||C |
)
|Ll |
(3)
where Ll is a specific layer of the DNN, |Ll | is the number of clus-
ters in the layer Ll , ICD is the intra-cluster distance for cluster Ci
belonging to layer Ll , |Cj | is the number of elements in cluster Cj ,
while |C | is the number of images in all the clusters.
In Formula 3, ICD(Ll ,Cj ) is computed as
ICD(Ll , Cj ) =
∑Nj
i=0 heatmapDistanceLl (pai , pbi )
Nj
(4)
where pi is a unique pair of images in clusterCj , and Nj is the total
number of pairs it contains. The superscripts a and b refer to the
two images of the pair to which the distance formula is applied.
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Agglomerative
Hierarchical
Clustering
... ...
Clusters for 
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to identify
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Layer NDistance 
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Error-inducing
test set images
Root Cause 
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Heatmaps 
at Layer N
Figure 6: Heatmap-based Clustering
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Figure 7: Clustering results for GazeDNN.
HUDD selects the layer Lm with the minimalWeightedAvgICD.
By definition, the clusters generated for layer Lm are the ones that
maximize cohesion and we therefore expect they group together
images that present similar characteristics, suggesting root causes
for DNN errors. In Formula 3, the factor |Cj ||C | normalizes the average
ICD with respect to the relative size of the cluster. This normaliza-
tion enables HUDD to penalize layers including large clusters with
high ICD. These clusters group together images with heatmaps
that are different from each other and thus may lead to DNN errors
due to different root causes.
Since the choice of the clustering objective function may affect
the quality of results, we rely on the number of generated clusters
to determine if an alternative objective function is needed. Indeed,
though we may a have a single root cause for distinct output classes,
we observe that there is often at least one root cause cluster for
each misclassified class (e.g., the one capturing boundary cases).
However, in the opposite, suspicious case when the number of root
cause clusters is lower than the number of output classes in the
test set for which we observe at least one DNN error, we re-run our
clustering procedure using average linkage (see Section 3.2) in the
hope of getting better results. In the end, we select the set of root
cause clusters with the lowestWeightedAvgICD.
4.2 Root Causes Inspection
Root cause clusters are then inspected by engineers to determine
unsafe conditions. For example, Figure 7 shows the clusters gen-
erated for the GazeDNN in Figure 1 on a test set with eye images
generated by UnityEyes. To simplify the understanding of root
causes, we printed the gaze angle on each image. Clusters C1 and
C2 group together images that lead to DNN errors because the
pupil is barely visible. Clusters C3 and C4 group images that are
misclassified because the gaze angle is close to the classification
threshold. Cluster C5 shows images that are misclassified because
the training set labels are incomplete and do not capture the case
of an eye looking middle center.
HUDD correctly handles both (1) the case in which erroneous
DNN results with different output labels share the same root cause
and (2) the case in which erroneous DNN results with the same
output label are caused by distinct root causes. The first case is
exemplified by cluster C5, which includes images that lead to dif-
ferent erroneous results (e.g., TopCenter or TopLeft) due to the
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same root cause (i.e., the eye is looking middle center but the DNN
was not trained to detect it). The second case is exemplified by
clusters C5 and C3, both including images erroneously classified as
TopCenter. In cluster C3, this is due to the gaze angle close to the
threshold with class TopRight whereas Cluster C5 includes images
erroneously classified as TopCenter that are actually middle center.
In addition, clusters C1, C2, and C5 show thatHUDD identifies
root causes that are associated with an incomplete training
set (e.g., borderline cases for gaze angle) but also with an incom-
plete definition of the predicted classes (i.e., the middle center
gaze detected by cluster C5 and the closed eyes detected by cluster
C2) and limitations in our capacity to control the simulator
(i.e., unlikely face positions detected by cluster C1). The first case is
addressed by HUDD retraining procedures (i.e., Steps 4-7) whereas
the other causes require that engineers modify the DNN (e.g., to
add an output class) or improve the simulator.
4.3 Identification of Unsafe Images
HUDD processes the improvement set to automatically identify
potentially unsafe images. This is done by assigning improvement
set images to root cause clusters while limiting the number of
assigned images to a user-specified thresholdU .
To assign images to clusters, HUDD relies on the error sum
of squares, which minimizes within-cluster variance. An image
y belonging to the improvement set IS should be assigned to the
clusterCj if the error sum of squares, SSE(Cj′) withCj′ = Cj ∪y, is
less than that of the other clusters Cc . SSE(Cj′) is computed as [28]
SSE(Cj′ ) =
∑Nj′
i=0 heatmapDistanceLm (pai , pbi )2
|Cj′ | (5)
The term pi represents a unique pair of images as in Equation 4,
Nj′ the total number of pairs in cluster Cj′ , and |Cj′ | refers to the
number of images in cluster Cj′ . HUDD selects cluster Cj with a
minimum SSE over all clusters.
Figure 8 shows the pseudocode of our algorithm for identifying
unsafe images. It requires the root cause clusters R, a configuration
parameterU indicating the maximum number of images per cluster
to return, and two distance matrices DMTS and DM IS . DMTS is the
distance matrix based on the error-inducing test set images that was
used to create the root cause clusters in Step 1. DM IS captures the
heatmap distances between the images in IS and the images in the
error-inducing test set, for the layer selected for the identification
of root cause clusters.
In Figure 8, Lines 3 to 17 compute SSE based on Equation 5.
Line 19 verifies that the image y, in addition to be assignable to
cluster Cj according to SSE, is indeed unsafe. Indeed, minimizing
SSE alone is not sufficient to identify unsafe images. Since the root
cause clusters capture only the unsafe portion of the input space, a
safe image might be assigned to clusterCj because it is accidentally
closer to cluster Cl . For this reason, HUDD only assigns an image
to a cluster if, in addition to leading to the minimal SSE, it does not
reduce cluster cohesion, i.e., it does not increase the intra-cluster
distance. Otherwise the image is not assigned to any cluster. In
Line 19, ICD_Cj′ and ICD_Cj are the intra-cluster distances for the
clusters Cj′ and Cj , respectively.
Require: (1) R , root cause clusters. (2) DMTS , distance matrix for the unsafe test set TS at layer
L. The matrix is m x m, where m is the number of error-inducing inputs in TS. (3) DMI S ,
distance matrix capturing the distance between images in the improvement set and images
in TS. (4)U , max number of improvement set images per cluster to return
Ensure: an associative array with the unsafe images associated to each root cause cluster
1: unsafeImages ← emptyList; unsafeSet ← emptySet
2: for y belonging to IS do
3: for Cj in R do
4: SSE_Cj = 0; ICD_Cj = 0 ; ICD_Cj′ = 0 ; pairs = 0
5: for t, image belonging toCj do
6: for u, image belonging toCj do
7: if index of t < index of u then
8: SSE_Cj += (DMTS [t ][u])2
9: ICD_Cj += DMTS [t ][u]
10: pairs += 1
11: SSE_Cj′ += (DMI S [y][t ])2
12: ICD_Cj′ += DMI S [y][t ]
13: ICD_Cj′ = (ICD_Cj + ICD_Cj′ )/(pairs + sizeof (Cj ))
14: ICD_Cj = ICD_Cj /pairs
15: SSE_Cj′ = (SSE_Cj + SSE_Cj′ )/(sizeof (Cj ) + 1)
16: SSE_Cj = SSE_Cj /sizeof (Cj )
17: store(y, c, ICD_Cj , ICD_Cj′, SSE_Cj , SSE_Cj′ )
18: identify cluster Cj with minimal SSE_Cj′ and retrieve ICD_Cj′ and ICD_Cj
19: if ICD_Cj′ ≤ ICD_Cj then
20: unsafeImages ← ⟨y, Cj ⟩
21: for Cj in C do
22: imgs ← select U images in unsafeImages with lowest SSE_Cj′ and Cj as right term
23: unsafeSet ← unsafeSet ∪ ⟨Cj , imgs⟩
24: Return unsafeSet
Figure 8: Algorithm for the identification of unsafe images
Finally, to keep the size of the unsafe set manageable, HUDD
selects up to U images per cluster. More precisely, for each cluster,
it selects the U images with the lowest SSE. The selected images
form the unsafe set, which are labeled by engineers when needed
(Step 6 in Figure 5) and then used for retraining.
4.4 DNN Retraining
HUDD retrains the DNNs by executing the DNN training process
against a data set that is the union of the original training set and
the labeled unsafe set. HUDD uses the available model to set the
initial configuration for the DNN weights. The original training set
is retained to avoid reducing the accuracy of the DNN for parts of
the input space that are safe (i.e., showing no error in the test set).
HUDD balances the unsafe set with bagging, i.e., it randomly
duplicates the images belonging to the cluster until it containsU
members. The retraining process is expected to lead to an improved
DNN model compared to that based on the original training set.
5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
Our empirical evaluation aims to address the following research
questions:
RQ1. Does HUDD enable engineers to identify the root causes
of DNN errors? We aim to investigate whether images belonging
to a same cluster, as generated by HUDD, present a common set of
characteristics that are plausible causes of DNN errors.
RQ2. How does HUDD compare to traditional DNN accuracy im-
provement practices?We aim to investigate whether HUDD enables
engineers to efficiently drive the retraining of a DNN compared to
state-of-the-art approaches.
To perform our empirical evaluationwe have implementedHUDD
as a toolset that relies on the PyTorch [32] and SciPy [35] libraries.
Our toolset, case studies, and results are available for download [2].
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Table 1: Case Study Systems
DNN Data Training Test Set Epochs Accuracy
Source Set Size Size Training Test
GazeDNN UnityEyes 61,081 132,630 10 96.84% 96.36%
ClosedDNN UnityEyes 1,704 4,232 10 85.82% 88.03%
TrafficNN TrafficSigns [14] 29,416 12,631 12 92.64% 81.64%
OD CelebA [22] 7916 5276 13 83.67% 84.12%
5.1 Subjects of the study
To address RQ1, we need to objectively and systematically identify
commonalities among images belonging to the same cluster. To do
so, we rely on images generated using simulators as it allows us
to associate each generated image to values of the configuration
parameters of the simulator. These parameters capture information
about the characteristics of the elements in the image and can thus
be used to objectively identify the likely root causes of DNN errors.
We consider DNNs that implement the key features of a gaze
detection system and a drowsiness detection system under devel-
opment at IPA. The gaze detection system has been presented in
Section 2.1. The drowsiness detection system features the same
architecture as the gaze detection system, except that the DNN pre-
dicts whether eyes are closed (hereafter referred as ClosedDNN).
The first two rows of Table 1 provide details about the two DNNs.
Column Data Source reports the name of the simulator generat-
ing the images used to train and test the network. GazeDNN and
ClosedDNN have been trained and tested with images generated
by UnityEyes. Column Epochs reports the number of epochs con-
sidered to train the network. The two DNNs have been trained
for a number of epochs sufficient to achieve accuracy above 80%.
Columns Training Set Size and Test Set Size show the size of the
training and the test set. Columns Accuracy Training and Accu-
racy Test show the accuracy obtained by the DNN when executed
against images in the training and test sets.
The training and test sets for GazeDNN and ClosedDNN have
been generated with UnityEyes. Since classes need to be balanced in
order to properly train the DNN, for ClosedDNN, we select a subset
of images consisting of all the closed eyes and a same number of
open eyes. For GazeDNN this is not needed since UnityEyes selects
the gaze angle according to a uniform distribution.
Since HUDD can be applied to DNNs trained using simulator
and real images, to address RQ2, which concerns the improvement
achieved after retraining the DNN, we also considered additional
DNNs trained using real-world images. We selected DNNs imple-
menting traffic sign recognition (TrafficNN), and object detection
(OD), which are typical features of automotive, DNN-based systems.
They are reported in the last two rows of Table 1. TrafficNN rec-
ognizes traffic signs in pictures. OD determines if a person wears
eyeglasses. OD has been selected to compare results with MODE,
a state-of-the-art retraining approach whose implementation is
not available (see Section 5.2.4), but which is close in objective to
HUDD. OD has been trained on the same dataset used for evaluating
MODE but we selected a subset of the available images to balance
classes (common practice). Though the original trained model is
not available, we achieved the same accuracy as the one reported.
The other two case studies considered in the MODE evaluation
were discarded because they are either not representative (i.e., low
accuracy) or lack information for enabling replication (i.e., descrip-
tion of inputs and outputs). All DNNs in Table 1 follow the AlexNet
architecture [21] which is commonly used for image classification.
5.2 Measurements and Results
We leverage simulators to refine RQ1 into three complementary
subquestions (RQ1.1, RQ1.2, RQ1.3), which are described in the
following, along with the results obtained.
5.2.1 RQ1.1. Do the clusters generated by HUDD show a significant
reduction in the variance of simulator parameters?
Design and measurements. This research question assesses if
images belonging to the same cluster present similar characteristics.
Since, in our case studies, images are generated by means of a
simulator, images in a cluster should present similar values for a
subset of the simulator parameters. In turn, this should result in a
reduction of variance for these parameters in comparison to the
entire error-inducing test set. For a cluster of imagesCi , the rate of
reduction in variance for a parameter p can be computed as follows:
RRCi = 1 − variance of p for the images in Civariance of p for the entire error−inducing set
Positive values for RRpCi indicate reduced variance.
Table 2 provides the list of parameters considered in our eval-
uation. We selected all the parameters provided by the simulator
except the ones that capture coordinates of single points used to
draw the pictures (e.g., eye landmarks) since these coordinates alone
are not informative about the elements in the picture. However, we
considered parameters capturing coordinates to compute metrics
that capture information about the scene in the image. We refer
to such metrics as derived parameters. For example, we compute
the distance between the bottom of the pupil and the bottom eyelid
margin (PupilToBottom in Table 2). It determines if the eye is in
an unusual position, e.g., if the eye is at the bottom of the orbit.
Hereafter, we use the term parameters to refer to both the selected
simulator parameters and derived parameters.
We compute the percentage of clusters showing reduction in
variance for at least one of the parameters. Since we do not know a
priori the number of parameters that capture common error causes,
we consider variance reduction in one parameter to be sufficient.
We compute the percentage of clusters with a reduction in vari-
ance between 0.0 and 0.9, with incremental steps of 0.10. To answer
positively our research question, a high percentage of the clus-
ters should show a reduction in variance for at least one of the
parameters.
Results. Figure 9 shows the percentage of clusters with variance
reduction for at least one of the simulator parameters, at different
reduction rates. HUDD identifies a total of 16 and 3 root cause
clusters for GazeDNN and ClosedDNN, respectively.
We can positively answer RQ1.1 since all the clusters present
at least one parameter with a positive reduction rate (>0 in Fig-
ure 9). Also, a very high percentage of the clusters (i.e., 93.75% for
GazeDNN and 66.67% for ClosedDNN) include at least one parame-
ter with a reduction rate above or equal to 0.5, i.e., a 50% reduction
in variance. Expectedly, as the threshold considered for variance
reduction increases, the percentage of clusters tends to decrease.
For a 0.9 threshold, we obtain 97.56% for GazeDNN. Instead, none
of the clusters of ClosedDNN show a variance reduction above 0.9.
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Table 2: Image parameters considered to address RQ1.1
Parameter Description
Gaze Angle Gaze angle in degrees.
Openness Distance between top and bottom eyelid in pixels.
H_Headpose Horizontal position of the head (degrees)
V_Headpose Vertical position of the head (degrees)
Iris Size Size of the iris.
Pupil Size Size of the pupil.
PupilToBottom Distance between the pupil bottom and the bottom eyelid margin.
PupilToTop Distance between the pupil top and the top eyelid margin.
DistToCenter Distance between the pupil center of the iris center. When the eye
is looking middle center, this distance is below 11.5 pixels.
Sky Exposure Captures the degree of exposure of the panoramic photographs
reflected in the eye cornea.
Sky Rotation Captures the degree of rotation of the panoramic photographs
reflected in the eye cornea.
Light Captures the degree of intensity of the main source of illumination.
Ambient Captures the degree of intensity of the ambient illumination.
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Figure 9: RQ1.1: Clusters with at least one parameter show-
ing a reduction rate above thresholds in the range (0.0 - 1.0).
5.2.2 RQ1.2. Does HUDD automatically identify the DNN layer that
is more informative for DNN-error root cause analysis?
Design and measurements. This research question investigates if
the layer selected by HUDD leads to the most informative clustering
results, i.e., clusters including images with common error causes.
Since similarity among images is assumed to be related to com-
mon error causes, which in turn are captured by reduction in pa-
rameter variance, the layer selected by HUDD should be the one
with clusters having the highest reduction in variance for at least
one parameter. Thus, to address RQ1.2, we compute, for every layer,
the average reduction in variance across all clusters, considering,
for each cluster, the parameter showing the highest reduction rate.
To positively answer this research question, HUDD should select
the DNN layer with the highest average reduction in parameter
variance across all clusters.
Results. Figure 10 shows two groups of boxplots reporting, for
GazeDNN (10a) and for ClosedDNN (10b), the reduction rate of the
parameter showing the highest reduction rate, for each cluster. The
red line reports the average reduction in variance across all the
clusters. The boxplots of the layer selected by HUDD are blue.
We can positively answer RQ1.2 since in both case studies, HUDD
selects the layer with the highest average reduction in variance
across all the clusters. For both cases, HUDD selects layer 9. The
selected layer also features the highest median (thick black line),
0.99 for GazeDNN and 0.54 for ClosedDNN.
In the case of ClosedDNN, we may observe that all the layers
lead to an average reduction in variance between 0.33 (layer 5) and
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Figure 10: Reduction in variance for the parameter with the
highest reduction rate. Red lines show the average across all
clusters in the layer. Whiskers indicate min/max values.
Table 3: Safety parameters considered to address RQ1.3
Parameter Unsafe values
Gaze Angle Values used to label the gaze angle in eight classes (i.e., 22.5◦ , 67.5◦ ,
112.5◦ , 157.5◦ , 202.5◦ , 247.5◦ , 292.5◦ , 337.5◦).
Openness Value used to label the gaze openness in two classes (i.e., 20 pixels)
H_Headpose Values indicating a head turned completely left or right (160◦ , 220◦)
V_Headpose Values indicating a head looking at the very top/bottom (20◦ , 340◦)
DistToCenter Value below which the eye is looking middle center (i.e., 11.5 pixels).
PupilToBottom Value belowwhich the pupil is mostly under the eyelid (i.e., -16 pixels).
PupilToTop Value belowwhich the pupil is mostly above the eyelid (i.e., -16 pixels).
0.48 (layer 9). However, for layers 9 and 10, half of the clusters
present a reduction rate above 0.5, as shown by the median. Layer
9 shows, however, the highest median and includes the cluster with
the highest reduction rate, 0.84 (top whisker). In conclusion, the
layer selected for ClosedDNN is also the most informative layer.
5.2.3 RQ1.3. Do parameters with high reduction in variance identify
the plausible cause for DNN errors?
Design and measurements. With RQ1.3, we ask whether the com-
monalities of the images belonging to the root cause clusters can
help engineers determine the root causes of the DNN errors.
We expect DNN errors to be triggered by specific portions of the
input space, each one capturing a characteristic of the input images.
To identify the portions of the input space that are unsafe for our
case studies, based on domain knowledge, we have identified a set
of parameters (hereafter, unsafe parameters) for which it is possible
to identify values (hereafter, unsafe values) around which, or below
which, we are likely to observe a DNN error. Table 3 provides the
list of unsafe parameters along with the unsafe values identified.
For example, for the Gaze Angle parameter, unsafe values consist of
the boundary values used to label images with the gaze direction.
Root cause clusters that are explanatory should present at least
one characteristic that is noticeable by the engineer, i.e., they should
have at least one parameter with high (i.e., 50%) reduction in vari-
ance. In addition, at least one of the parameters with high variance
reduction should be an unsafe parameter. Finally, the cluster aver-
age should be close to one unsafe value. For Gaze Angle, Openness,
H_Headpose, and V_Headpose, since unsafe values split the param-
eter domains into subranges, we determine that the cluster average
is close to one unsafe value if the difference between them is below
25% of the subrange including the average value. For DistToCenter,
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Table 4: RQ2. Size of Images Set used for Retaining and Accuracy Improvement
Size of Images Set for Retraining Accuracy Accuracy (Accuracy improvement) Delta
HUDD B1 B2 Original wrt best
Case study L RCC IS US U BLUS IS LUS ALUS IS ALIS Model HUDD B1 B2 Baseline
GazeDNN W 16 72500 12208 3000 48000 12208 823.2 48000 12208 48000 95.95% 96.91% (+0.96)* 92.10% (-3.85)* 95.77% (-0.18)* +1.14%
ClosedDNN W 3 72500 322 500 1500 322 69.2 1500 322 1500 88.03% 93.45% (+5.42) 84.20% (-3.83) 91.88% (+3.85) +1.57%
TrafficNN A 287 9775 615 50 3050 615 45.1 3050 615 3050 81.65% 92.23%(+10.58) 91.17% (+9.52) 91.18% (+9.53) +1.05%
OD W 5 13194 900 300 900 900 145.8 900 900 900 84.12% 96.91%(+12.79) 96.48%(+12.36) 96.61%(+12.49) +0.30%
L: Linkage performed (Ward, Average), RCC: Root Cause Clusters, IS: Improvement Set, US: Unsafe Set, U: size of root cause clusters in unsafe set; BLUS: Balanced Labeled Unsafe
Set; LUS: Labeled Unsafe Set (average over all the runs); ALUS/ALIS: Augmented Labeled Unsafe/Improvement Set, *Accuracy for full test set: 96.22%, 91.10%, 94.95%.
PupilToBottom, and PupilToTop, we simply check if the average is
below or equal to the unsafe value. Finally, we compute the per-
centage of clusters for which the condition above holds. To answer
positively to RQ1.3, this percentage should be high.
Results. In the case of GazeDNN, according to the conditions
defined above, the percentage of clusters that identify the likely
root cause of DNN errors is very high: 87.50% or 14 out of 16. For one
of the two clusters not meeting the conditions, the unsafe parameter
(i.e., DistToCenter) has a reduction in variance of 40%, below the
50% threshold. This threshold is however arbitrary and the manual
inspection of the cluster clearly shows that the commonality is the
eye looking middle center. The other non-compliant cluster shows
pupils being partially masked by the eyelid; however, we could not
define a measure to systematically capture this situation based on
simulator parameters.
In the case of ClosedDNN, we obtain 66.66% (2 out of 3), with
Openness being the unsafe parameter. The remaining cluster is char-
acterized by thin almond eyes, an aspect of the simulation that is
not controllable with parameters. Based on the above observations,
we respond positively to RQ1.3.
5.2.4 RQ2. How does HUDD compare to traditional DNN accuracy
improvement practices? This research question aims to compare
the accuracy improvements achieved by HUDD with the improve-
ments achieved by baseline approaches, which do not rely on the
automated selection of predicted unsafe images.
We consider two baseline approaches, namely B1 and B2. B1
has been introduced in Section 2.2 and consists of selecting for
retraining the misclassified images belonging to the labeled im-
provement set. B2 is depicted in Figure 11. It follows the HUDD
process except that it selects unsafe set images randomly (i.e., the
Reduced improvement set) instead of relying on root cause clusters.
B2 enables us to evaluate the benefits of selection based on root
cause clusters over random selection.
To not introduce bias in the results, we rely on the same experi-
ment setting for all the approaches (i.e., same configuration of the
DNN training algorithm, and same number of images to be labeled).
In the case of HUDD, only the images in the unsafe set need to
labeled. In the other cases, all the images in the improvement set
need to be labeled. For this reason, for the two baselines, we select
an improvement set that is a random subset of the improvement
set used by HUDD (referred to as reduced improvement set) and has
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Figure 11: Baseline 2 (B2).
the same size as the unsafe set generated by HUDD. To account for
randomness, we repeat the experiment 30 times.
With HUDD, for retraining the DNN, we applied the approach
described in Section 4.4. For B1 and B2, we configure bagging to
generate an augmented labeled unsafe set and an augmented labeled
improvement set with the same size as the balanced labeled unsafe
set for HUDD.
To answer the research question, we compute the accuracy of the
retrained models on the test set and compare the accuracy improve-
ment obtained by HUDD with that obtained by the baselines. We
considered all the case studies listed in Table 1. The improvement
set for GazeDNN and ClosedDNN has been generated through ad-
ditional executions of UnityEyes. For the other cases, we selected
images of the original datasets not used for training and testing.
Test sets are described in Section 5.1. Since some of the GazeDNN
errors are due to root causes that cannot be addressed by retrain-
ing the DNN (i.e., clusters C1, C2, and C5 in Figure 7), we have
excluded from the test set all the images (1996 in total) belonging
to these root cause clusters. Results achieved with the full test set
are however provided in the footnote of Table 4.
Results. The first ten columns of Table 4 provide the number of
images used to retrain the DNNs. We set the maximum number of
images per cluster (i.e., U ) to obtain a bagged labeled unsafe set
with at least 900 elements and an unsafe set with not more than
one third of the original training set, in line with related work [23].
The remaining columns of Table 4 show the accuracy of the
retrained models. Negative values indicate that the accuracy of the
retrained model is worse than the original model. HUDD always
fares significantly better than the baseline approaches. Based on a
non-parametric Mann Whitney test, the difference in accuracy is
always significant with a p-value < 0.05. Vargha and DelaneyâĂŹs
Aˆ12 effect size is always above 0.8 (large) [1].
HUDD improvements range from 0.96 to 12.79. On the other
hand, B1 and B2 improvements range from -3.85 to 12.36 and -0.18
to 12.49, respectively. The negative results obtained by the baselines
for the case of GazeDNN and ClosedDNN show that retraining the
DNN without targeting the DNN-error root causes may lead to
worse accuracy. The choice of an inadequate strategy for retraining
DNNs is therefore particularly detrimental since one could invest
significant time and effort in labeling improvement set images
without any benefit.
The difference in accuracy improvement between HUDD and
the best baseline ranges between 0.30 (OD) and 1.57 (ClosedDNN).
Given that all techniques cost the same according to our experiment
design, it is therefore recommended to use HUDD. Though these
differences may appear small, they may nevertheless be important
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in the context of critical applications where every percentage point
in improvement matters. Furthermore, one should recall that we are
dealing with highly accurate DNNs whose range for improvement
is limited.
Finally, results with OD show that HUDD achieves better ac-
curacy than MODE (96.91% vs 89% after DNN retraining). These
results show the potential of HUDD which, in addition to having a
higher accuracy than MODE, also provides root cause clusters.
Threats to validity.We target safety-critical, automotive sys-
tems. To address threats to generalizability, for RQ2, we have consid-
ered DNNs performing classification of body parts and road objects,
typical features in automotive systems. For RQ1, we had to consider
a subset of the case studies having high-resolution simulators avail-
able. Though HUDD background technology (i.e., LRP and HAC) is
context-independent, future work will investigate the evaluation
of the approach in different contexts (e.g., space industry).
6 RELATEDWORK
Most of the DNN testing and analysis approaches are summarized
in recent surveys [12, 45]. Unfortunately, research on the automated
debugging and repair of DNNs is still at very early stages.
Under-approximation boxes [11] consist of the minimal set of
neurons, belonging to a specific layer, that ensure a postcondition
(e.g., the generation of a specific DNN output). When applied to
explainmisclassifications they lead to heatmap-like images showing
the minimal set of input pixels leading to the same DNN result.
Similarly, Ribeiro et al., identify the image chunks that are sufficient
to generate a certain DNN result [33]. Like heatmap generation
techniques, these two approaches cannot automatically identify the
root cause for a group of error-inducing images but they require
manual inspection for every error-inducing image.
Decision trees can identify patterns of neuron activations com-
mon to a same output class [11]. They are not used to explain
misclassifications [11] and cannot be applied to look for patterns in
root cause clusters because these clusters are not known a priori.
MODE automatically identifies the images to be used to retrain
a DNN [23]. However, it cannot identify the root causes of DNN
errors, which is a major limitation in our context. HUDD andMODE
differ also regarding the selection of images to be used for retraining,
which, in the case of MODE, is not based on the heatmaps but on
training additional DNN layers that capture commonalities among
neuron activations leading to DNN errors. MODE, therefore, entails
repeated modification and retraining of the DNN under test, just to
select the improvement set, which is an expensive endeavor.
Surprise adequacy measures the degree of variation in neuron
activations between a new image and the training images belonging
to the same class [19]. Empirical results show that a retraining
set with a varying degree of surprise adequacy improves DNN
robustness against adversarial examples. It has never been adopted
to improve accuracy for non-adversarial inputs. Also, like previous
techniques, it cannot be used to identify root causes of DNN errors.
DeepFault identifies a set of suspicious neurons to synthesize
new, adversarial images and improveDNN adversarial robustness [7].
Since it relies on synthesized adversarial inputs, it cannot improve
accuracy for unsafe, non-adversarial inputs. Once again, it does not
distinguish different root causes.
Apricot [44] repairs DNNs by changing the weights of the DNN
model. It works by trainingmultiple DNNs on subsets of the training
and test sets. The repair process aims to minimize (maximize) the
distance between the weights of the DNN to repair and the weights
of DNNs leading to better (worse) accuracy. Unfortunately, the
accuracy improvement achieved by Apricot is lower than 2% even
when the test accuracy for the original model is low (< 80%).
Gao et al. [8] and Engstrom et al [6] rely on image transforma-
tions (e.g., rotations) to augment the training set and improve DNN
robustness, thus addressing a different a problem.
With respect to a recent taxonomy of DNN faults [13], HUDD
can identify different types of training and input faults while it
automatically addresses problems due to training data quality (see
Section 4.2). A more extensive evaluation of HUDD based on the
taxonomy is part of our future work.
To summarize, HUDD is the first approach that facilitates the
scalable identification of distinct failure root causes in DNNs by
applying clustering algorithms to heatmaps generated by DNN
explanation techniques. For the latter, we rely on Layer-Wise Rele-
vance Propagation (LRP), which is based on theoretical foundations
that are generalizable to other DNN architectures. Further, HUDD
relies on standard retraining procedures based on back propagation
and gradient analysis, that have been widely applied and validated,
and does not entail the direct modification of the learned DNN
model.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced HUDD, an approach that automatically
identifies the different situations inwhich an image processingDNN
is likely to produce erroneous results. HUDD generates clusters (i.e.,
root cause clusters) containing misclassified input images sharing
a common set of characteristics that are plausible causes for errors.
This is achieved through an hierarchical agglomerative clustering
algorithm applied to heatmaps capturing the relevance of neurons
of different DNN layers on the result.
In addition, HUDD minimizes the effort required to select and
label additional images to be used to augment the training set
and improve the DNN. This is done by automatically selecting
images that are close to the centroid of the root cause clusters
and thus unsafe. Only these selected images are then labeled by
engineers. Since DNN errors are often due to an incomplete training
set (e.g., lack of images with a gaze angle close to borderline), HUDD
alleviates the problem by augmenting the training set with unsafe
images.
Empirical evaluation with simulator images show that HUDD
generates clusters of images sharing similar values for some of
the simulation parameters driving the generation of images. We
can conclude that such clusters can then serve as a useful instru-
ment for the identification of root causes of DNN errors. In turn,
this information is important to safety analysis as it helps clearly
characterize unsafe inputs, a requirement in safety standards. Our
results, on both simulated and real images, also show how these
clusters can be effectively used to select new images for retraining
in a way that is more efficient than existing practices and leading
to better DNN accuracy.
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